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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
JOURNAL OF LAW & LIBERTY 
BOND V. UNITED STATES: 
CAN THE PRESIDENT INCREASE 
CONGRESS'S LEGISLATIVE POWER BY 
ENTERING INTO A TREATY?* 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz•• 
On November 5, 2013, the Supreme Court heard oral argument 
in Bond v. United States,1 and as we go to press, the case is still pend-
ing before the Court. This is a terrific case, first because it has such 
lurid facts. Mrs. Bond discovered that her husband had impregnat-
ed her best friend,2 so she did what anyone would do. She acquired 
some chemicals and spread them on the friend's doorknob, car 
door, and mailbox.3 
' This is an introduction to an amici curiae brief supporting the petitioner in Bond 
v. United States, filed on behalf of the Cato Institute, Center for Constitutional Juris-
prudence, and Atlantic Legal Foundation. The brief is reprinted infra at 233. 
" Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center and a Senior Fellow 
in Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute. 
1 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. ar-
gued Nov. 5, 2013). 
2 Brief for Respondent at 4, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 5, 
2013). 
3 Id. at 4-5. 
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This conduct is, of course, all sorts of state crime. 4 But Mrs. 
Bond was not prosecuted for these state crimes. Instead, she was 
prosecuted by an ambitious Assistant United States Attorney, for 
violating the federal Chemical Weapons Convention Implementa-
tion Act.5 
Now to be fair, this statute is written extremely broadly; 6 on its 
face, it would appear to reach all sorts of purely local conduct like 
Mrs. Bond's - conduct that hardly seems to be of national, let alone 
international, concern.7 And so the question in the case is: did Con-
gress have the power to enact such a broad statute?B 
The government's primary argument9 is that Congress does 
have such power, because this statute was enacted to implement a 
treaty.10 The government argues, in other words, that-even assum-
ing Congress would lack the power to enact this statute ordinari-
ly- it has the power in this case, because the United States has en-
tered into a treaty concerning chemical weapons.11 That is the big 
issue in the case: can a treaty increase the legislative power of Congress? 
Now the great Paul Clement, arguing on behalf of Mrs. Bond, 
offered the Court several ways to rule in favor of his client without 
reaching this big issue.12 In particular, he suggested that the Court 
4 Brief for Petitioner at 20-23, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 
5, 2013). 
s See id. at 7. 
6 See generally Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-856 (2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 229 et. seq.). 
7 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 46-50. 
s Id. at i-ii; Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, § I. 
9 The Government expressly waived any reliance on the Commerce Clause earlier 
in the litigation, see Joint Appendix at 31, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. 
argued Nov. 5, 2013) ("Section 229 was not enacted under the interstate commerce 
authority."), but it nevertheless attempts to resuscitate the Commerce Clause argu-
ment at the Supreme Court. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 17-26. 
10 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 2, at 26-27. 
n See id. 
12 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 12, 18-24. 
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might construe the statute narrowly; hold that it actually does not 
reach Mrs. Bond's conduct; and thus avoid the difficult constitu-
tional question of whether a treaty can increase the power of Con-
gress.13 Clement was savvy to offer the Court this option: Justice 
Breyer, at least, seemed tempted by it at oral argument,14 and it 
might well win the day. 
But we as amid, took a different approach.15 From our perspec-
tive, this is a perfect case in which to answer the big question. And 
it is well worth answering, because an erroneous chestnut of a 
caseI6 and an erroneous foreign affairs treatise17 have left the erro-
neous impression, for almost a century, that a treaty can, in fact, 
increase the legislative power of Congress. In our view, that conclu-
sion is in deep tension with the basic constitutional axiom of limited 
federal power. 
At first glance, this issue might seem an odd fit for this Journal. 
This case is about a deep principle of constitutional structure, and 
13 See id. at 12, 18-22, 24; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 42-57. 
14 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 35 Oustice Breyer said to Gen-
eral Verrilli: "There's an easy way out of [deciding the constitutional question]. All 
we do is say the chemicals involved are the chemicals in the annex."); id. at 48-49 
Oustice Breyer also said to General Verrilli: "in principle your position constitution-
ally would allow the President and the Senate, not the House, to do anything 
through a treaty that is not specifically within the prohibitions of the rights protec-
tions of the Constitution .... Isn't there an easier way to deal with this case?"). 
1s See generally Brief for Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 5, 2013). 
16 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-34 (1920) ("If the treaty is valid there 
can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article 1, Section 8, as a 
necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government."). 
17 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 481 
n.111 (2nd ed. 1996) ("The 'necessary and proper' clause originally contained ex-
pressly the power 'to enforce treaties' but it was stricken as superfluous."); LoUIS 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 408 n.105 (1st ed. 1972) (same). 
But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REv. 
1867, 1875, 1912-18 (2005) ("The words 'enforce treaties' never appeared in the Nec-
essary and Proper Oause."). 
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thus, one might think, only tangentially related to individual liber-
ty. But nothing could be further from the truth. Matters of constitu-
tional structure are inextricably bound up with matters of individu-
al liberty. The deep structural themes of the Constitution -
federalism and separation of powers-are ultimately the Constitu-
tion's most powerful safeguards of liberty. Indeed, the Court saw 
this point clearly, in the prior iteration of this very case, in a passage 
that could be an apt epigraph for this new journal. The Court wrote: 
Federalism secures the freedom of the individual. ... By 
denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all 
the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of 
the individual from arbitrary power. When government 
acts in excess of its lawful powers, that liberty is at stake.18 
For this reason, this structural issue is actually a perfect fit for 
the New York University Journal of Law and Liberty. If a treaty could 
increase the legislative power of Congress, then the constitutional 
axiom of limited federal power would be a sham.19 Our constitu-
tional structure - and the liberty that it exists to preserve -would 
be subject to change at the whim of the President, the Senate, and 
Zimbabwe.20 
Unfortunately, the Court may not reach the big question in 
Bond. But we reach it here, in our amicus brief, in which we argue 
only the simple and crucial point: a treaty cannot increase the legisla-
1s Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
19 Brief for Cato Institute, supra note 15, at 6-7. 
20 Id. at 21-22. See also Transcript of Oral Argument, at 32-33, Golan v. Holder, 132 
S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545) Gustice Scalia said "I don't think that powers that Con-
gress does not have under the Constitution can be acquired by simply obtaining the 
agreement of the Senate, the President and Zimbabwe. I do not think a treaty can 
expand the powers of the Federal Government."). 
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tive power of Congress. 21 The brief is essentially a distillation of an 
article that I wrote in 2005,22 and we are grateful to the Harvard 
Law Review for permission to, in effect, reprint substantial sections 
of that article. We are grateful, too, to the Journal of Law and Liberty 
for choosing to showcase this brief. 
21. See generally Brief for Cato Institute, supra note 15, at 21-22. 
22 See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REv. 1867 (2005). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court below held that the Chemical Weapons Convention 
increased the power of Congress, empowering it to enact 18 U.S.C. § 
229. It held, in other words, that Congress is not limited to those 
powers enumerated in the Constitution; rather, those powers may 
be increased by treaty. The Third Circuit believed that it was bound 
to reach this conclusion by a single, conclusory sentence in Missouri 
v. Holland: "If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the 
validity of the [implementing] statute under Article I, Section 8, as a 
necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Govern-
ment.1 But the Third Circuit was obviously uneasy with this conclu-
sion: "with practically no qualifying language in Holland to turn to, 
we are bound to take at face value" that single sentence.2 "[I]t may 
be that there is more to say about the uncompromising language 
used in Holland than we are able to say, but that very direct lan-
guage demands from us a direct acknowledgement of its meaning, 
even if the result may be viewed as simplistic. If there is nuance that 
has escaped us, it is for the Supreme Court to elucidate."3 
Judge Ambro was even more explicit in concurrence: 
I write separately to urge the Supreme Court to provide a 
clarifying explanation of its statement in ... Holland . ... I 
hope that the Supreme Court will soon flesh out "[t]he most 
important sentence in the most important case about the 
constitutional law of foreign affairs," and, doing so, clarify 
(indeed curtail) the contours of federal power to enact laws 
1 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
2 Bond v. United States, 681 F.3d 149, 162 (3d Cir 2012). 
3 Id. at 164-65 (footnote omitted). 
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that intrude on matters so local that no drafter of the Con-
vention contemplated their inclusion in it.4 
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That one conclusory sentence from Holland implies that if a trea-
ty commits the United States to enact some legislation, then Con-
gress automatically obtains the power to enact that legislation, even 
if it would otherwise lack such power. It implies, in other words, 
that Congress's powers are not constitutionally fixed, but rather 
may be expanded by treaty. 
In Holland, Justice Holmes provided neither reasoning nor cita-
tion for this proposition. It appears in that one conclusory sentence, 
in a five-page opinion that is primarily devoted to a different ques-
tion. And this Court has never elaborated. The most influential ar-
gument supporting this proposition appears not in the United States 
Reports but in the leading foreign affairs treatise. This argument has 
largely short-circuited jurisprudential debate on the question. But 
recent scholarship has shown that the historical premise of this aca-
demic argument is simply, demonstrably false. 
The proposition that treaties can increase the power of Con-
gress is inconsistent with the text of the Treaty Clause, the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. It is incon-
sistent with the fundamental structural principle that "[t]he powers 
of the legislature are defined, and limited."S It implies, insidiously, 
that that the President and the Senate can increase their own power 
by treaty. And it implies, bizarrely, that the President alone-or a 
foreign government alone - can decrease Congress's power and 
render federal statutes unconstitutional. Finally, it creates a doubly 
perverse incentive: an incentive to enter into foreign entanglements 
simply to increase domestic legislative power. 
4 Id. at 170 (Ambro, J., concurring) (quoting Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Execut-
ing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (2005)). 
5 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
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Holland is wrong on this point and it should be overruled. This 
Court should hold that treaties cannot vest Congress with addition-
al legislative power. 
ARGUMENT 
I. HOLLAND IS INCONSISTENT WITH CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
A. CONGRESS'S LEGISLATIVE POWER CAN BE INCREASED ONLY BY 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, NOT BY TREATY 
Under Holland, some statutes are beyond Congress's power to 
enact absent a treaty, but within Congress's power given a treaty. 
This implication runs counter to the textual and structural logic of 
the Constitution, because it means that Congress's powers are not 
constitutionally fixed. 6 Under Holland, the legislative power is not 
limited to the subjects enumerated in the Constitution; it can extend 
to all of those subjects, plus any others that may be addressed by 
treaty. And according to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Re-
lations Law of the United States: 
[T]he Constitution does not require that an international 
agreement deal only with "matters of international con-
cern." The references in the Constitution presumably incor-
porate the concept of treaty and of other agreements in in-
ternational law. International law knows no limitations on the 
purpose or subject matter of international agreements, other 
than that they may not conflict with a peremptory norm of 
international law. States may enter into an agreement on 
any matter of concern to them, and international law does not 
6 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §4-4, at 645-46 (3d ed. 
2000). ("By negotiating a treaty and obtaining the requisite consent of the Senate, the 
President ... may endow Congress with a source of legislative authority independ-
ent of the powers enumerated in Article I."). 
2013] BOND V. UNITED STATES 
look behind their motives or purposes in doing so. Thus, 
the United States may make an agreement on any subject 
suggested by its national interests in relations with other na-
tions.7 
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If this is so, then Congress's legislative powers are not merely 
somewhat expandable by treaty; they are expandable virtually with-
out limit. The President could,· for example, enter into a treaty to 
regulate guns near schools - and then Congress could re-enact Gun 
Free School Zones Act, despite United States v. Lopez. 8 Indeed, that is 
the tip of the iceberg. "The Commerce Clause is not a general li-
cense to regulate an individual from cradle to grave,"9 but under 
Holland, a treaty could be just such a license. The President might, 
ostensibly to foster better relations with another country, simply 
exchange reciprocal promises to regulate the citizenry so as to max-
imize the collective welfare. If Holland means what it seems to say, 
then such a treaty would confer upon Congress plenary legislative 
power. 
That proposition is, of course, flatly inconsistent with the basic 
constitutional scheme of enumerated powers; it is in deep tension 
with the Tenth Amendment's premise of reserved powers; and it 
stands contradicted by countless canonical statements that Con-
gress's powers are fixed and defined. It is axiomatic that "the Con-
stitution[] confer[s] upon Congress ... not all governmental pow-
ers, but only discrete, enumerated ones." lo And, of course, "enu-
meration presupposes something not enumerated."11 In Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's words: "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, 
7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 302 cmt. c (1987). 
s 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
9 Nat'! Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012). 
10 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997). 
11 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). 
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and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, 
the constitution is written."12 
Indeed, in this very case, this Court explained: "By denying any 
one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of pub-
lic life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbi-
trary power."13 This would be no protection at all if the legislative 
power were readily expandable by treaty. All of these propositions, 
from Marbury to Bond, are flatly inconsistent with Holland. 
B. CONGRESS ONLY POSSESSES THE 11 LEGISLA TIVE POWERS HEREIN 
GRANTED." 
The point is reinforced by the juxtaposition of the three Vesting 
Clauses. Article II, Section 1, provides that /1 [t]he executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America 14, and 
Article III, Section 1, provides that /1 [t]he judicial Power of the Unit-
ed States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish." 15 By contrast, Article I, Section 1, provides: /1 All legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States."16 
There is a simple explanation for this difference in the Vesting 
Clauses. Congress is the first mover in the mechanism of U.S. law. It 
"make[s] ... Laws."17 By contrast, the executive branch subsequently 
11 execute[s]" the laws made by Congress, and the judicial branch 
12 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (emphasis added). 
13 United States v. Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
14 U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1 (emphasis added). 
1s U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1 (emphasis added). 
16 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 1 (emphasis added). 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). 
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interprets those laws. The scope of the executive and judicial power, 
therefore, is contingent on acts of Congress. 
For example, the Constitution provides that the President "shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."18 By passing a new 
statute, Congress may expand the President's powers by giving him 
a new law to execute. As Justice Jackson explained, "[w]hen the 
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate."19 In 
other words, the scope of the executive power is not fixed; it is con-
tingent on acts of Congress. 
The judicial power is contingent in just the same way. Indeed, it 
is expressly contingent, not only on statutes but also on treaties. 
Article III provides that the judicial power shall "extend" to certain 
sorts of cases and controversies.20 The verb "to extend" suggests 
today just what it signified in 1789: stretching, enlarging.21 And, in 
particular, "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authori-
ty."22 This clause expressly provides that the scope of the judicial 
power may be expanded by treaty. A new (self-executing) treaty, 
like a new statute, can give the judiciary something new to do, thus 
expanding its jurisdiction. Thus, it would not have made sense to 
limit the federal courts to the powers "herein granted," because the 
1s U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 3. 
19 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) Qackson, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
20 See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1. 
21 See, e.g., SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (W. Stra-
han et al., 4th ed. 1773) ("To EXTEND ... 1. To stretch out towards any part .... 5. To 
enlarge; to continue .... 6. To encrease in force or duration .... 7. To enlarge the com-
prehension of any position .... 9. To seize by a course of law." (emphases added)). 
22 U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1 (emphases added). 
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scope of the judicial power may be expanded, not only by statute 
but also by treaty. 
But, crucially, Article I has no such provision. The legislative 
power does not "extend ... to Treaties made, or which shall be 
made."23 Indeed, the legislative power does not "extend" at all. Ra-
ther, .the only legislative powers in the Constitution are those that 
are enumerated, those that the document says are "herein granted." 
The scope of the legislative power-unlike the scope of the execu-
tive and judicial powers-does not change with the passage of stat-
utes or the ratification of treaties. The legislative power alone is 
fixed rather than contingent, and so it alone is limited to an enu-
meration of powers "herein granted." 
Indeed, this structural fact- reflected in the textual dichotomy 
between the Vesting Clause of Article I and those of Articles II and 
III-coheres perfectly with the underlying theory of separation of 
powers. To create a tripartite government of limited powers, it is 
logically necessary that at least one of the branches have fixed pow-
ers - powers that cannot be increased by the other branches. As one 
would expect, that branch is Congress. Congress is the first branch 
of government, the first mover in American law, the fixed star of 
constitutional power.24 Congress can increase the President's pow-
er, but the President cannot increase Congress's power in return. If he 
could, the federal government as a whole would cease to be one of 
limited powers. 
Moreover, to the extent that the jurisdiction of any branch may 
be increased, it is naturally left to different political actors to work 
the expansion. To entrust Congress to expand the jurisdiction of the 
23 Id. 
24 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Savereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1443 n.71 
(1987) ("Congress remained in many ways primus inter pares. Schematically, Article I 
precedes Articles II and III. Structurally, Congress must exercise the legislative pow-
er before the executive and judicial powers have a statute on which to act."). 
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executive and the judiciary is consistent with the theories of Mon-
tesquieu and Madison, because Congress has no incentive to over-
extend the powers of the other branches at its own expense.25 
But it is quite another matter to entrust treaty-makers-the 
President and Senate - to expand the power of lawmakers -the 
President and Senate, plus the House. Here, there is no ambition to 
counteract ambition; here, instead, ambition is handed the keys to 
power. 26 As Henry St. George Tucker III wrote in his treatise on the 
treaty power five years before Holland, "[s]uch interpretation would 
clothe Congress with powers beyond the limits of the Constitution, 
with no limitations except the uncontrolled greed or ambition of an 
unlimited power."27 
C. HOLLAND ENABLES THE CIRCUMVENTION OF ARTICLE V. 
Another way to put the point is that Holland permits evasion of 
Article V's constitutional amendment mechanism. As a general rule, 
25 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *142 ("[W]here the legislative and 
executive authority are in distinct hands, the former will take care not to entrust the 
latter with so large a power, as may tend to the subversion of [its] own independ-
ence, and therewith of the liberty of the subject."). 
26 See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 
bk. XI, ch. IV, at 161 (photo. reprint 1991) G.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent trans., 
G. Bell & Sons 1914) (1748) ("[E]very man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and 
to carry his authority as far as it will go."); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 (1983) 
("[T]he profound conviction of the Framers that the powers conferred on Congress 
were the powers to be most carefully circumscribed."); THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 306 
Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The legislative department is every-
where extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex."); THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313-14 Games Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) ("[T]he tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the 
legislative at the expense of the other departments."). 
Z1 HENRY ST. GEORGE TuCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER § 113, 
at 130 (1915). 
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the legislative power can be increased only by constitutional 
amendment. This expansion has happened several times.ZS 
The process provided by the Constitution for its own amend-
ment is of course far more elaborate than the process for making 
treaties.29 But if Holland means what it seems to say, then treaties 
"may endow Congress with a source of legislative authority inde-
pendent of the powers enumerated in Article I."3o In other words, 
the legislative power of Congress may be increased not just by con-
stitutional amendment but also by treaty. 
This Court rejected an analogous implication in City of Boerne v. 
Flores: 
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the 
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the 
Constitution be "superior paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means." It would be "on a level with ordinary leg-
islative acts, and, like other acts, ... alterable when the leg-
islature shall please to alter it." Under this approach, it is 
difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congres-
sional power. Shifting legislative majorities could change 
the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult 
and detailed amendment process contained in Article V. 31 
Holland achieves under the Necessary and Proper Clause exact-
ly what City of Boerne rejected under Fourteenth Amendment. Read 
literally, Holland renders the Necessary and Proper Clause expand-
able by the political branches with the ratification of each new trea-
ty. It thus allows the President and Senate to work an expansion of 
28 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2; amend. XIX, 
cl. 2; amend. XXIII, § 2; amend. XXIV, § 2; amend. XXVI, § 2. 
29 Compare U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2, with U.S. CONST. Art. V. 
30 TRIBE, supra note 6. 
31 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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legislative power -which "effectively circumvent[ s] the difficult 
and detailed amendment process contained in Article V." 32 This 
cannot be right: 
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those 
who created the Constitution, as well as those who were re-
sponsible for the Bill of Rights - let alone alien to our entire 
constitutional history and tradition - to construe Article VI 
as permitting the United States to exercise power under an 
international agreement without observing constitutional 
prohibitions. In effect, such construction would permit 
amendment of that document in a manner not sanctioned 
by Article V.33 
D. IF HOLLAND WERE CORRECT, THENTHEPREsIDENT-ORA 
FOREIGN SoVEREIGN - COULD DECREASE CONGRESS'S POWER AND 
RENDER U.S. STATUTES UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
If it is strange to think that the legislative power can be expand-
ed, not only by constitutional amendment, but also by an action of 
the President with the consent of the Senate, it is surely stranger still 
to think that the legislative power may be contracted by the Presi-
dent alone. Yet this too is an implication of Holland. 
As a general matter, "[i]f [a] statute is unconstitutional, it is un-
constitutional from the start."34And, conversely, if a statute is con-
stitutional when enacted, it generally can be rendered unconstitu-
tional only by a constitutional amendment. In other words, "[a] 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 529 (citations omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 177 (1803); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
34 The Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objec-
tionable Legislation, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 59 (1980). 
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statute ... must be tested by powers possessed at the time of its en-
actment."35 
Holland is inconsistent with that fundamental principle. Under 
Holland, some exercises of legislative power derive their authority 
not from the Constitution but from specific treaties.36 If so, then 
when such treaties are terminated, their implementing statutes pre-
sumably become unconstitutional.37 Such statutes are suddenly ren-
dered unconstitutional-not by constitutional amendment but by the 
mere abrogation of a treaty. This is paradoxical. "The peculiar cir-
cumstances of the moment may render a measure more or less wise, 
but cannot render it more or less constitutional."38 
And if it is strange to think of a statute becoming unconstitution-
al, surely it is stranger still to think that the President may render a 
statute unconstitutional unilaterally and at his sole discretion. Yet this 
is what follows from Holland. The Executive Branch takes the posi-
tion that the President has power to abrogate treaties unilaterally.39 
If so, then the President, by renouncing a treaty, could unilaterally 
render an implementing act of Congress unconstitutional. 
This result is inconsistent with the basic proposition that "re-
peal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with [Article] 
1."40 This Court did not hesitate to strike down a statute that "au-
35 Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 254 {1921) 
36 See TRIBE, supra note 6 (treaties "may endow Congress with a source of legisla-
tive authority independent of the powers enumerated in Article I"). 
37 See LoUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 408 n.105 (1st ed. 
1972) ("[I]n principle legislation to implement a treaty might cease to be valid if the 
treaty lost its effect."). 
38 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (quoting Chief Justice John Marshall, A Friend of the Con-
stitution, Alexandria Gazette, July 5, 1819, reprinted in John Marshall's Defense of 
McCulloch v. Maryland 190-191 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969)). 
39 See Validity of Congressional-Executive Agreements That Substantially Modify 
the United States' Obligations Under an Existing Treaty, 20 Op. O.L.C. 389, 395 n.14 
(1996). 
40 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983). 
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thorize[d] the President himself to effect the repeal of laws, for his 
own policy reasons, without observing the procedures set out in 
Article I, § 7."41 The reason was simple: "[t]here is no provision in 
the Constitution that authorizes the President ... to repeal stat-
utes."42 Yet under Holland, legislation that reaches beyond enumer-
ated powers to implement treaties is, in effect, subject to a different 
rule. Here, in essence, the President has a unilateral power "to effect 
the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons." 43 Whenever he 
chooses, he may abrogate a treaty and thus render any implement-
ing legislation unconstitutional. 
And that is not the worst of it. The President is not the only one 
who can terminate a treaty. Our treaty partners can likewise re-
nounce treaties.44 Under Holland, therefore, it is not only the Presi-
dent who can, at his own discretion, render certain statutes uncon-
stitutional by renouncing treaties. Foreign governments can do this too. 
Surely the Framers would have been surprised to learn that a feder-
al statute-duly passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by 
the President-may, under some circumstances, be rendered un-
constitutional at the discretion of, for example, the King of England. 
After all, ending the King's capricious control over American legis-
lation was the very first reason given on July 4, 1776, for the Revolu-
tion.45 
41 Id. at 529 (citations omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 177 (1803). 
42 Id. at 438. 
43 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 445. 
44 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 204 
(2d ed. 1996) ("[A treaty] is not law of the land if it ... has been terminated or de-
stroyed by breach (whether by the United States or by the other party or parties)." (em-
phasis added)). 
45 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2-4 (U.S. 1776). 
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All these paradoxes can be resolved only if Congress's legisla-
tive power is, in fact, fixed by the Constitution and cannot be ex-
panded by treaty. 
E. HOLLAND CREATES DOUBLY PERVERSE INCENTIVES-INCENTIVES 
FOR MORE INTERNATIONAL ENTANGLEMENTS, WHICH IN TuRN 
INCREASE DOMESTIC LEGISLATIVE POWER 
The Framers were profoundly concerned about the tendency of 
legislative power to expand.46 The Framers were also deeply wary 
of international entanglements. 47 If the Framers feared expanding 
legislative power and feared international entanglements, then Hol-
land would have been their worst nightmare. Under Holland, treaty-
makers - the President and Senate-are given a wish-for-more-
wishes power. They can increase their own legislative power (plus 
that of the House). All they need is a willing head of state, any-
where on the globe, and a new entangling alliance. 
This constitutes a powerfully perverse incentive for the Presi-
dent and Senate to enter into treaties that reach beyond enumerated 
46 See The Federalist No. 48, supra note 26, at 306 ("The legislative department is 
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its im-
petuous vortex."); The Federalist No. 49, supra note 26, at 313-14 ("[T]he tendency of 
republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of 
the other departments."); see also The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between 
the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 131 (1996) (Dellinger, Assistant At-
torney General) ("Although the founders were concerned about the concentration of 
governmental power in any of the three branches, their primary fears were directed 
toward congressional self-aggrandizement."(citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 411 n.35 (1989))). 
47 See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in WRITINGS 
1136-39 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed. 1984) (calling for "peace, commerce, and honest 
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none"); GEORGE WASHINGTON 
FAREWELL ADDRESS, S. Doc. No. 106-21, at 27 (2000) ("It is our policy to steer clear of 
permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."). 
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powers. After all, it is they themselves (plus the House of Repre-
sentatives) who will be the beneficiaries of the increased domestic 
legislative power. Indeed, the treaty-makers apparently succumbed 
to just this temptation in Holland itself, as even its most ardent de-
fenders concede: "If ever the federal government could be charged 
with bad faith in making a treaty, this had to be the case."48 
The Constitution should not be construed to create this doubly 
perverse incentive-an incentive to enter foreign entanglements 
merely to attain the desired side effect of increased domestic legisla-
tive power. The Constitution should not be interpreted to encour-
age this sort of bad faith. 
II. HOLLAND IS A DOCTRINAL ANOMALY 
Holland is thus inconsistent with fundamental principles of con-
stitutional structure. But it is also anomalous, even in relation to its 
closest doctrinal cousins. To see the doctrinal anomaly, it is useful 
to restate the general question. If a non-self-executing treaty prom-
ises that Congress will do something that it otherwise lacks power 
to do, what happens? Can the President (with the consent of the 
Senate), just by making such a promise, thus empower Congress to 
do that thing, even if Congress lacked the power to do so the day 
before? In short, can the treaty increase the legislative power of 
Congress? 
Now, it is undisputed that treaties are important. And it is un-
disputed that the United States should generally keep its promises. 
Nevertheless - and notwithstanding the uncompromising language 
48 David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MIGL L. REv. 1075, 1256 (2000). 
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used in Holland"49_it is also undisputed that the answer to this question 
is generally "no." 
If, for example, the treaty promised that Petitioner would be 
tried without presentment or indictment of a grand jury, the treaty 
would not thereby empower Congress to authorize a violation of 
the Fifth Amendment. Congress lacked that power before the treaty, 
and the treaty cannot confer it.50 
If the treaty promised that Petitioner would be tried by military 
tribunal rather than by jury, the treaty would not thereby empower 
Congress to authorize a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Con-
gress lacked that power before the treaty, and the treaty cannot con-
fer it.51 
And this principle extends beyond the Bill of Rights. If the trea-
ty promised a violation of Article III, Congress is not thereby em-
powered to authorize a violation of Article III. Congress lacked that 
power before the treaty, and the treaty cannot confer it.52 
Indeed this principle extends beyond express constitutional 
prohibitions and includes constitutional structure as well. If the 
treaty promised "a change in the character of the government, or in 
that of one of the states, or a cession of any portion of the territory 
of the latter, without its consent," Congress is not thereby empow-
ered to accomplish such things. 53 Congress lacked that power be-
fore the treaty, and the treaty cannot confer it. 
And if, despite Printz54 and New York v. United States55, a treaty 
promised that Congress would commandeer state officials or state 
49 Bond, 681 F.3d at 165. 
50 Reid, 354 U.S. at 16-17. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. at 17-18. 
53 De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). 
54 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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legislatures for its execution, then - even according to Holland's 
preeminent defender - Congress would not thereby be empowered 
to commandeer them.56 Congress lacked that power before the trea-
ty, and the treaty cannot confer it. 
This leaves only Holland - the one anomalous exception to an 
eminently sensible rule. If a treaty promises that Congress will reg-
ulate something that is beyond its enumerated powers - guns near 
schools,57 or violence against women,58 then, under Holland, Con-
gress would automatically attain that new legislative power, even 
though, under this Court's precedents, it lacks that power today. 
This cannot be right. "[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can 
confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, 
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution." 59 And as to this, 
there is no basis for distinguishing enumerated powers and the 
Tenth Amendment from the rest of the Constitution. "Federalism," 
no less than the Bill of Rights, "secures the freedom of the individu-
al."60 
Reid is right, and Holland is wrong. A treaty cannot empower 
Congress to violate the Fifth Amendment, or violate the Sixth 
Amendment, or undermine Article III, or commandeer state offi-
cials, or subvert constitutional structure. Likewise, a treaty cannot 
empower Congress to exceed its enumerated powers and violate 
the Tenth Amendment.61 
ss 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
56 See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 467 n.75 
(2d ed. 1996) ("Presumably, the United States could not command state legislatures, 
or 'coopt' state officials by treaty."). 
57 See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
58 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
59 Reid, 354 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
60 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
61 See John C. Eastman, Will Mrs. Bond Topple Missouri v. Holland?, 2010-11 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 185, 194-202 (2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1941434. 
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This Court realized this long before Holland, in a case that Jus-
tice Holmes failed to cite. As this Court explained in 1836: "The 
government of the United States ... is one of limited powers. It can 
exercise authority over no subjects, except those which have been 
delegated to it. Congress cannot, by legislation, enlarge the federal 
jurisdiction, nor can it be enlarged under the treaty-making power."62 
Indeed, Justice Scalia made exactly the same point at oral argument 
just last Term: "I don't think that powers that Congress does not 
have under the Constitution can be acquired by simply obtaining 
the agreement of the Senate, the President and Zimbabwe. I do not 
think a treaty can expand the powers of the Federal Govemment."63 
At that time, less than a year ago, the Solicitor General was in 
"complete[] agreement."64 
III. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE DOES NOT EXPAND WITH 
EACH NEW TREATY 
As this Court explained when it first encountered this case, the 
"ultimate issue" here turns on the conjunction of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and the Treaty Clause. 65 The question is whether 
these two Clauses in conjunction somehow require all the anoma-
lous results detailed above. To answer that question, it is essential 
to examine the text of the two clauses and determine how they fit 
together. Article I provides: 
62 New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836) (emphasis add-
ed). 
63 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32-33, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) 
(No. 10-545). 
64 Id. at 33. 
65 Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2367 (2011). 
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The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department or Officer thereof.66 
The Treaty Clause provides: 
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur.67 
251 
By echoing the word "Power," the Treaty Clause leaves no 
doubt: the treaty power is an "other Power[]" referred to in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
That much is implicit in Holland, although Justice Holmes did 
not quote either clause, let alone discuss how they fit together. But 
the conjunction of the two clauses is essential to analyzing whether 
a treaty may increase congressional power. Here, then, is the way 
that these two clauses fit together as a matter of grammar: 
The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
... [the President's] Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.68 
When the two clauses are properly conjoined, it becomes clear 
that the key term is the infinitive verb "to make." The power ,grant-
ed to Congress is emphatically not the power to make laws for car-
66 U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2 
67 U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
68 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, art. II,§ 2. 
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rying into execution "all treaties." Rather, what may be carried into 
execution is the "Power ... to make Treaties." 
This power would certainly extend to laws appropriating mon-
ey for the negotiation of treaties. As Rep. James Hillhouse explained 
in 1796, "the President has the power of sending Ambassadors or 
Ministers to foreign nations to negotiate Treaties ... [but] it is ... 
clear that if no money is appropriated for that purpose, he cannot 
exercise the power."69 
But on the plain text of the conjoined clauses, the object of this 
necessary and proper legislation is limited to the "Power ... to make 
Treaties" in the first place. This is not the power to implement trea-
ties already made. 
Nor will it do to say that the phrase "make Treaties" is a term of 
art meaning "conclude treaties with foreign nations and then give 
them domestic legal effect." There is no indication that the phi:ase 
"make Treaties" ever had such a meaning. British treaties at the 
time of the Framing were non-self-executing, requiring an act of 
Parliament to create enforceable domestic law,7° and yet Blackstone 
wrote simply of "the king's prerogative to make treaties," without 
any suggestion that Parliament had a role in the "mak[ing].".71 
Blackstone understood the difference between making a treaty, 
which the King could do, and giving it domestic legal effect, which 
required an act of Parliament. The "Power ... to make Treaties''. is 
exhausted once a treaty is ratified; implementation is something 
else altogether. 
This Court saw that textual point clearly when construing a 
statute with similar language, to wit, the "right ... to make ... con-
69 5 Annals of Cong. 673-74 (1796). 
70 See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 274 (1796), 
n BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *249 (emphases added); see also id. at *243 ("[T]he 
king ... may make what treaties ... he pleases." (emphasis added)); id. at *244 ("[T]he 
king may make a treaty." (emphasis added)). 
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tracts."72 This statutory "right ... to make ... contracts" is textually 
and conceptually parallel to the constitutional "Power ... to make 
Treaties" both because they share the key infinitive verb "to make" 
and because, as Chief Justice Marshall explained, a non-self-
executing treaty (like the one at issue in this case) is itself in the na-
ture of a contract.73 This Court explained: 
[T]he right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of 
either logic or semantics, to conduct ... after the contract re-
lation has been established, including breach of the terms of 
the contract .... Such postformation conduct does not in-
volve the right to make a contract, but rather implicates the 
performance of established contract obligations ... 74 
This is exactly right- and it is flatly inconsistent with Holland. The 
"Power ... to make Treaties" does not extend, as a matter of logic or 
semantics, to the implementation of treaties already made. 
The title of the present statute suffices to finish the point. "The 
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998" im-
plements a treaty; it is neither necessary nor proper to make any trea-
ty. . 
IV. THE MOST INFLUENTIAL ARGUMENT SUPPORTING HOLLAND IS 
BASED ON A MISREADING OF CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
Justice Holmes set forth no arguments whatsoever for the 
proposition that treaties can increase Congress's legislative power. 
72 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006)). 
73 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("[W]hen the terms of the 
stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a partic-
ular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and 
the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the court."). 
74 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491U.S.164, 177 (1989) (emphases added). 
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And subsequent scholars and courts have generally contented 
themselves with a citation to Holland. But one eminent scholar has 
presented a single substantive argument in support of this proposi-
tion, based upon the drafting history of the Constitution. 
As discussed above, the legislative power, unlike the judicial 
power, does not expressly "extend to ... Treaties made, or which 
shall be made" 75; indeed, the legislative power does not "extend" at 
all. Rather, the legislative power is limited by the Constitution to 
those powers that it enumerates- those that are "herein grant-
ed."76 And the Necessary and Proper Clause-even when conjoined 
with the "Power . . . to make treaties" - says nothing whatsoever 
about enforcing treaties already made.77 
To these textual points, though, Professor Louis Henkin has an 
apparently devastating reply based on constitutional drafting histo-
ry: "The 'necessary and proper' clause originally contained expressly the 
power 'to enforce treaties' but it was stricken as superfluous. "78 This is 
the most powerful form of argument from constitutional history, 
because it is so specific and unambiguous. On this drafting history, 
it would certainly appear that the Necessary and Proper Clause - in 
its final form, without those crucial words - still subsumes the 
power "to enforce treaties" beyond the other enumerated powers. 
This argument from drafting history would appear to be a complete 
answer to the textual arguments above; indeed it would appear to 
obviate the need for textual analysis altogether. 
75 U.S. CoNsr. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1 
76 U.S. CoNsr. art. I,§ 1. See supra Part 1-B. 
77 See supra Part III. 
78 HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 1HE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 481 n.111 (2d 
ed. 1996) (emphasis added). 
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And so, unsurprisingly, this argument has proven quite influ-
ential. 79 Indeed, when this Court invoked Holland nine years ago, it 
cited Henkin's treatise.80 Likewise, in this very case, the Govern-
ment relied on this argument to oppose a motion to dismiss certain 
counts of the indictment- quoting this exact drafting history as set 
forth by Professor Henkin. Neither Lara nor the Government's brief 
opposing the motion to dismiss carefully parsed or conjoined the 
text of the Treaty Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause,s1 
but this is perfectly understandable. (Indeed, the phrase "necessary 
and proper" and the phrase "to make treaties" never appear in the 
same sentence in the United States Reports.) After all, any such 
analysis of the actual constitutional text was obviated by Henkin' s 
ostensibly dispositive drafting history. 
But Professor Henkin was wrong. As recent scholarship has 
demonstrated, he simply misread the constitutional history. The 
words "to enforce treaties" never appeared in any draft of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. They were never struck as superfluous from that 
Clause, because they never appeared in that Clause at all. The 
phrase "enforce treaties" was struck from the Militia Clause, which 
was apparently the source of Henkin' s confusion. s2 But that drafting 
history provides no support for Holland.B3 
In short, the leading treatise on the law of foreign affairs makes 
exactly one argument in support of Holland's unreasoned assump-
79 It appeared in the first edition of Henkin's treatise, see Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 408 n.105 (1st ed. 1972), and again, a generation 
later, in the second edition, see LoUJS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 480 n.108, 481 n.111 (2d ed. 1996). 
so United States v. Lara, 541U.S.193, 201 (2004). 
s1 See supra Part III. 
82 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 323, 382 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1937). 
83 See Rosenkranz, supra note 4, at 1912-18. 
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tion that treaties can increase the legislative power of Congress. 
This treatise has profoundly influenced debate on this question, and 
its argument from constitutional drafting history has, for decades, 
short-circuited any careful analysis of the actual constitutional text. 
But, as it turns out, the argument in the treatise is based on a histor-
ical premise that is simply, demonstrably false. 
V. HOLLAND SHOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED ON STARE DECISIS 
GROUNDS 
At first glance, Holland might appear to present the strongest 
possible case for application of stare decisis. It is 93 years old. It was 
written by Justice Holmes. And it is canonical. 
But the argument for stare decisis is not nearly as compelling as 
it may first appear. The opinion may be canonical, but on the point 
at issue-Congress's power to legislate pursuant to treaty- it is also 
utterly unreasoned. The stare decisis force of an opinion turns, in 
large part, on the quality of its reasoning and diminishes substan-
tially if it provides no reasoning at all.84 
Moreover, while Holland is 93 years old, its holding concerning 
legislative power pursuant to treaty has been all but irrelevant for 
most of that time. Again, Holland's key sentence on this point is this 
one: "If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity 
of the [implementing] statute under Article I, Section 8, as a neces-
sary and proper means to execute the powers of the Govemment."85 
But in 93 years, this Court has never once quoted any part of that 
B4 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("(W]hen governing decisions 
are ... badly reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent."' 
(quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944))). 
as Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
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sentence. It can hardly be contended that there has been much reli-
ance upon it. 
The reason is clear. From 1937 to 1995, this Court did not strike 
down a single statute as beyond Congress's enumerated powers. 
Throughout the decades when the Commerce Clause power was 
construed to be essentially plenary, the question of expanding Con-
gress's legislative power by treaty was almost entirely hypothetical. 
During those years, any legislation that Congress enacted to execute 
a treaty could almost certainly have also been sustained under the 
Co~erce ClauseB6 or some other enumerated power.87 Only after 
Lopez,88 did Holland's secondary holding, on the scope of treaty-
related legislative power, recover potential practical significance. 
Thus, any supposed reliance of the political branches on this hold-
ing must be dated from 1995, not 1920. 
Even since 1995, this Court has struck down only three statutes 
as beyond the enumerated powers of Congress. 89 It can hardly be 
said, therefore, that the conduct of foreign affairs has been under-
taken in substantial reliance on the rule that federal legislative pow-
er may be increased by treaty. 
86 Earlier in this litigation, the government foreswore any reliance on the Com-
merce Clause. JA31 ("Section 229 was not enacted under the interstate commerce 
authority."). It seems inappropriate to allow the government to resuscitate the 
Commerce Clause argument at this late date. But even if the government is to be 
allowed to reverse course as to this argument (and confess error for the second time 
in this case), the proper place for it would be on remand. This Court should decide 
the treaty question addressed by the opinion below. 
87 See Tribe, supra note 6, § 4-4, at 646 ("The importance of treaties as independent 
sources of congressional power has waned substantially in the years since ... Holland 
... [;] the Supreme Court (in the intervening period has] so broadened the scope of 
Congress' constitutionally enumerated powers as to provide ample basis for most 
imaginable legislative enactments quite apart from the treaty power."). 
ss 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
89 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (invalidating part of the Violence Against Women 
Act); Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 (invalidating part of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act). 
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Scholars only now are discovering Holland's potential for evad-
ing this Court's stated limits on congressional power.9o If the politi-
cal branches should move to act on the proposals of these scholars, 
that would constitute unfortunate reliance on erroneous doctrine. 
But right now-while these proposals are in the law reviews and 
not in Treaties in Force or Statutes at Large - Holland may be over-
ruled on this point without any dislocation of foreign relations or 
domestic law. 
This Court has not hesitated to reconsider a canonical opinion 
when new scholarship in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW demonstrates 
that the conventional historical account was simply wrong.91 And 
this Court has not hesitated to overrule such an opinion when it 
becomes clear that the opinion is fundamentally inconsistent with 
constitutional structure. 92 This is just such a case. 
In short, Holland may be canonical, but it d0es not present a 
strong case for stare decisis. It was wrongly decided on this point, 
and it should be overruled. 
90 See Rosenkranz, supra note 4, at 1871-73 & nn.19-25 (collecting articles). 
91 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 n.5 (1938) (citing Charles War-
ren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 
51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923)). 
92 Erie, 304 U.S. at 77 (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)). 
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CONCLUSION 
A treaty cannot confer new legislative power on Congress, and 
so the treaty at issue here did not empower Congress to enact 
18 U.S.C. § 229.93 The Third Circuit's judgment should be reversed. 
93 Jt is a quirk of the pleadings that Petitioner purports to challenge the statute 
"as-applied." That characterization may be inapt, because the gravamen of the claim 
concerns the scope of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
which would seem to be "facial" by nature. In any case, and regardless of the vexed 
"facial"/ "as-applied" dichotomy, the important point is that her challenge is neces-
sarily a challenge to legislative action. This Court should hold that Congress exceeded 
its power (and thus violated the Tenth Amendment), by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 229. See 
Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2368 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[A] law beyond the power of 
Congress ... is no law at all. The validity of Bond's conviction depends upon whether 
the Constitution permits Congress to enact § 229."); see generally Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010). 
